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Abstract
Ongoing research has proposed several methods to de-
fend neural networks against adversarial examples, many
of which researchers have shown to be ineffective. We
ask whether a strong defense can be created by combin-
ing multiple (possibly weak) defenses. To answer this
question, we study three defenses that follow this ap-
proach. Two of these are recently proposed defenses that
intentionally combine components designed to work well
together. A third defense combines three independent de-
fenses. For all the components of these defenses and the
combined defenses themselves, we show that an adaptive
adversary can create adversarial examples successfully
with low distortion. Thus, our work implies that ensem-
ble of weak defenses is not sufficient to provide strong
defense against adversarial examples.
1 Introduction
Neural networks have achieved great performance on a
wide range of application domains; in particular, they
have demonstrated accuracies comparable or better than
humans on datasets in the fields of image recogni-
tion [10] and speech recognition [29]. However, re-
cent work shows that deep learning models are suscep-
tible to adversarial examples: inputs that are similar
to a correctly classified input, but which are misclassi-
fied [28]. Research on other applications of neural net-
works has also encountered adversarial examples on dif-
ferent tasks beyond image classification, including deep
policies in reinforcement learning and generative mod-
els [15, 14, 12, 2]. Adversarial examples pose serious
threat in particular in security-critical autonomous sys-
tems such as self-driving cars. Recent work has shown
that adversarial examples remain even when subject to
the lossy channel of being photographed [17].
Developing effective defenses against adversarial ex-
amples is an important topic. Despite many attempts [27,
7, 9, 21, 8, 6, 5, 11], there is no strong defense against ad-
versarial examples to date.
In this paper, we ask the question: if we ensemble mul-
tiple defenses to adversarial examples, will the combined
defense be significantly stronger than the original indi-
vidual defense? If it did, then one possible approach
to constructing a robust defense to adversarial examples
would be to join together many defenses, each of which
independently is only slightly effective, but together are
strong. This is an important question for designing effec-
tive defense against adversarial examples. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to systematically investi-
gate this question.
Towards answering this question, we study three in-
stances of ensembled defenses. First, we study two re-
cently proposed defenses, feature squeezing [30] and
the specialists+1 ensemble method [1], each of which
ensembles multiple defenses that compensate for each
other’s weaknesses. Note that feature squeezing and the
specialists+1 ensemble are explicitly designed to com-
bine component defenses that work well together, with
the intention of creating a stronger defense.
To study the question of ensemble defense in a broader
scope, we also evaluate an ensemble of three indepen-
dent, mutually compatible detection mechanisms [6, 21,
5]. This represents an approach that combines defenses
which were not designed to be used together.
The works that introduce these defenses showed that
they are effective at detecting attacks generated for the
classifier models to which they are applied. However, we
find that neither the components of these defenses nor the
combined defenses are effective against an attacker that
is aware of the defense.
We evaluate these defenses with new attacks, spe-
cific to the defenses. Our attacks are able to defeat all
aforementioned defenses with low distortion. From this,
we conclude that combining weak defenses, even ones
seem to work well together, is insufficient for defending
against an adaptive attacker.
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Contributions We make the following contributions:
• We create effective attacks on feature squeez-
ing [30], including individual squeezing methods
and the combined adversarial example detection
scheme.
• We create an effective attack on the ensemble-of-
specialists defense [1].
• We create effective attacks on an ensemble of re-
cently proposed detectors. We show that adversarial
examples can bypass an ensemble of detectors with
nearly as little distortion as needed for the strongest
individual detector.
• Our results show that ensembled defenses do not
provide significantly more resilience against adver-
sarial examples than each individual component in-
cluded in the ensemble. This implies that an en-
semble of weak defenses is not sufficient to provide
a strong defense against adversarial examples.
• Our evaluation demonstrates that adaptive adversar-
ial examples transfer across several defense or de-
tection proposals. This phenomenon may provide
one reason to explain why ensembling is not an ef-
fective approach to building defense mechanisms
against adversarial examples.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in
Section 2, we provide the problem statement and back-
ground information; in Section 3, we describe our attacks
on individual feature squeezing defense component and
their composite defense; in Section 4, we describe our
attack results on the ensemble-of-specialists defense; in
Section 5, we describe our attack results on a composite
defense that combines multiple independently proposed
detection networks; and we summarize our findings in
Section 6.
2 Overview
We start with an overview of background information,
then we define the threat models we use and the problem
statement and setup for our experiments.
2.1 Background: Adversarial Examples
Recent works have pointed out that deep learning mod-
els are vulnerable to adversarial examples: these models
give incorrect predictions on inputs that are slightly dif-
ferent from those correctly predicted ones [28, 7, 23, 26].
Specifically, suppose we have a classifier F with
model parameters θ . Let x be an input to the classifier
with corresponding ground truth prediction y. An adver-
sarial example x∗ is some instance in the input space that
is close to x by some distance metric d(x,x∗), but causes
Fθ to produce an incorrect output. Here we only consider
those x satisfying Fθ (x) = y.
Prior work considers two classes of adversarial exam-
ples. First, an untargeted adversarial example is an in-
stance x∗ that causes the classifier to produce any incor-
rect output: Fθ (x∗) 6= y. Second, a targeted adversarial
example is an x∗ that causes the classifier to produce a
specific incorrect output y∗: Fθ (x∗) = y∗ where y 6= y∗.
Several approaches have been proposed in previ-
ous work, including the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [7], Fast Gradient Method [19], Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) [26], Deepfool [22],
and optimization-based methods [28, 3, 19].
2.2 Threat Models
In this work, we assume the adversary has full knowl-
edge of the model, including the model architecture, pa-
rameters, and the defense strategies used in the model.
Prior work has shown this assumption can often be re-
laxed [7, 24, 25], however for simplicity we assume this
stronger threat model.
Within these white-box attackers, we consider two ca-
pacities of adversaries.
Static Adversary. A static adversary is an attacker
that is not aware of any defenses that may be in place to
protect the model against adversarial examples. A static
adversary can generate adversarial examples using exist-
ing methods but does not tailor attacks to any specific
defense.
Adaptive Adversary. An adaptive adversary is an at-
tacker that is aware of the defense methods used in the
model, and can adapt attacks accordingly. This is a
strictly more powerful adversary than static adversary. In
this paper, we consider this stronger adversary.
2.3 Problem Statement
To improve the robustness of models against adversar-
ial examples, prior work investigates into two directions.
The first direction attempts to produce correct predic-
tions on adversarial examples, while not compromising
the accuracy on legitimate inputs [27, 7, 9]. The other
(more recent) direction instead attempts to detect adver-
sarial examples, without introducing too many false pos-
itives. In this case, the model can reject an instance
and refuse to classify those that it detects as adversar-
ial [21, 8, 30, 1].
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In this paper, we ask the question: if we ensemble
multiple defenses to adversarial examples, then will the
combined defense be significantly stronger than each in-
dividual original defense? If it did, then one possible
approach to constructing a robust defense to adversarial
examples would be to join together many defenses, each
of which independently is only slightly effective, but to-
gether are strong. This is an important question for de-
signing effective defense against adversarial examples.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to system-
atically investigate this question.
Defenses considered. In this paper, we consider de-
fenses that attempt to combine multiple (somewhat
weaker) defenses to construct a larger strong defense. In
particular, we look at three instances of ensemble de-
fense strategies. First and second are feature squeez-
ing [30] and the specialists+1 ensemble method [1],
both of which take this approach by construction. These
defenses are constructed from components that are in-
tended to be useful together. Their authors have shown
that these defenses effectively detect low-perturbation
adversarial examples generated by a static adversary.
Third, to study the effectiveness of ensembling defenses
more broadly, we merge together many detectors that
were not designed to be used in conjunction with any
other detector. In particular, as an example demonstra-
tion, we ensemble three independent detection mecha-
nisms [6, 21, 5] to build one detection mechanism.
For each of these defense strategies, we propose at-
tack methods to generate adversarial examples as an
adaptive adversary against the individual component de-
fense (when applicable) as well as the composite de-
fense strategy. We use these attack methods to evalu-
ate each component defense and composite defense: if
our method succeeds at generating adversarial examples,
this means that an adaptive adversary can defeat the de-
fense. To gauge how strong the combined defense is
compared to the components, we compare the level of
distortion needed to fool each (using the same optimiza-
tion method).
2.4 Experimental Setup
Datasets and models. To evaluate the effectiveness
of the different defense strategies, we use two standard
datasets, MNIST [18] and CIFAR-10 [16] datasets.
For both datasets, we randomly sample 100 images in
the test set, filter out examples that are not correctly clas-
sified, and generate adversarial examples based on the
correctly classified images. When evaluating each de-
fense strategy, we use the same model architectures de-
scribed in their papers respectively [30, 1, 6, 21, 5].
Adversarial examples on MNIST tend to have higher
distortion than natural images.
Adversarial example generation method. In this pa-
per, we use an optimization-based approach to generate
adversarial examples [3], which is shown to be effective
on finding adversarial examples with small distortions.
At a high level, the attack uses an optimizer to mini-
mize a loss function:
loss(x′) = ‖x′− x‖22+ c · J(Fθ (x′),y)
Here, Fθ is a part of the trained classifier that outputs
a vector of logits, and J computes some penalty based on
the logits and some label y, either a ground truth label for
non-targeted attacks or a target label for targeted attacks.
A constant c is a hyperparameter that adjusts the relative
weighting between distortion and misclassification. We
omit details of the design choice and refer the reader to
the original paper [3].
Measurement of distortion. Unless otherwise speci-
fied, we measure the distortion between an adversarial
example and the original input as the L2-norm of their
distance. Formally, d(x∗,x) =
√
∑i(x∗i − xi)2. Each di-
mension of input images is scaled to [0,1], i.e., 0 ≤
x∗i ,xi ≤ 1.
3 Adaptive attacks on feature squeezing
In this and next section, we investigate ensemble defense
strategies that are intentionally constructed to have com-
ponent defenses which work together to detect adver-
sarial examples. The first defense we study is feature
squeezing, proposed by Xu et al. [30, 31].
Background: feature squeezing defense. To perform
feature squeezing, one generates a lower fidelity version
of the input image through a process known as “squeez-
ing” before passing it into the classifier. Xu et al. pro-
posed two methods of squeezing: reducing the color
depth to fewer bits, and spatially smoothing the pixels
with a median filter. According to their paper, the two
methods of squeezing work well together because they
address two major kinds of perturbation used in adver-
sarial examples: color depth reduction eliminates small
changes to many pixels, while spatial smoothing elimi-
nates large changes to a few pixels.
In order to detect adversarial examples, Xu et al. pro-
pose a system combining the two squeezing methods.
First, the system runs the classifier on three different ver-
sions of the image: the original image, the reduced-color-
depth version and the spatially smoothed version of the
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original image. Then, it compares the softmax probabil-
ity vectors across these three classifier outputs. The L1
score of the input is the highest L1 distance between any
pair of softmax probability vectors among the three. It
flags inputs where the L1 score exceeds a threshold as
adversarial.
In their experiments, Xu et al. show that MNIST and
CIFAR-10 classifiers are accurate on squeezed inputs.
On adversarial examples generated by a static adversary
using FGSM [7] and JSMA [26], they show that their
detector achieves 99.74% accuracy on a test set with
equal portions benign and adversarial examples. They
also show that squeezing the input alone prevents 84 –
100% of the adversarial examples (correctly classifying
them). Recently, Xu et al. showed that a simplified de-
tector that uses the original version of the input and the
spatially-smoothed version (excluding the color-depth-
reduced version) achieves a 98.80% overall detection ac-
curacy on MNIST and 87.50% on CIFAR-10 against a
static adversary using a variety of Carlini and Wagner’s
attacks [31].
Summary of our approach and results. We demon-
strate that feature squeezing is not an effective defense in
two stages. First, we show that an adaptive attacker can
construct an adversarial example that remains adversarial
after it is squeezed by each method (color depth reduc-
tion and spatial smoothing. Then, we use this approach
to construct adversarial examples that are classified the
same way both with and without squeezing, causing the
L1 score to be smaller than a given fixed threshold. Our
results show that the combined detection method is not
effective against an adaptive attacker.
3.1 Evading individual feature squeezing
defense components
In these experiments, we evaluate whether adversarial
examples are robust to each individual feature squeezing
defense component, i.e., whether adversarial examples
remain adversarial after each individual feature squeez-
ing process (color depth reduction and spatial smooth-
ing) separately. These experiments attack the com-
ponents of the combined feature squeezing detection
scheme. Performing this attack is necessary for defeat-
ing the combined detection scheme, wherein the pre-
dicted label probabilities of squeezed images are com-
pared against each other.
3.1.1 Evading color-depth-reduction defense
The first method of squeezing an image that Xu et al. pro-
pose is color depth reduction. This method rounds each
Figure 1: Adversarial examples for color depth reduction
(to 1 bit) on MNIST. First row: original images. Second
row: adversarially perturbed. Distortions, from left to
right: 1.49, 2.61, 2.63, 3.83, 3.89, 3.90.
value in the input to 2b evenly spaced values spanning
the same range, which we refer to as reducing to b bits.
Attack Approach. We use the method described in
Section 2.4 to generate adversarial examples that are ro-
bust to color depth reduction. After each step of the op-
timization procedure, an intermediate image (perturbed
from the original image) is available from the optimizer.
We check if a reduced-color-depth version of this inter-
mediate image is adversarial. We run the optimization
multiple times, initializing the optimization with random
perturbations of the original image each time, so that it
explores different optimization paths. For each original
image, we keep the successful adversarial example that
has the lowest L2 distance to the original image among
all the generated successful adversarial examples for this
original image.
Although this approach successfully generated low-
distortion adversarial examples in our experiments, there
is no guarantee that it should succeed in the general case.
We present an alternative approach in Appendix A which
produced examples with higher distortion, but which
may be useful in other scenarios.
Attack results on MNIST. We evaluate color depth
reduction to 1 – 7 bits. On the strongest defense eval-
uated by Xu et al., which reduces color depth to 1 bit,
we successfully generated adversarial examples for all
original images, with an average distortion of 3.86. Fig-
ure 1 shows a sample of these adversarial examples. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes our results for other bit depths. Notice
that for a system without any color depth reduction (re-
taining the original 8 bits of depth), we find adversarial
examples with an average distortion of 1.38. Reducing
color depth to fewer bits makes the system less sensitive
to small changes, which requires larger distortions; how-
ever, the distortions are still very small.
Attack results on CIFAR-10. We evaluate color depth
reduction to 3 bits, which Xu et al. recommend as a good
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Bit depth Adv success Avg L2
1 100% 3.86
2 99% 1.69
3 100% 1.43
4 100% 1.39
5 100% 1.44
6 100% 1.33
7 100% 1.33
8 100% 1.38
Table 1: Summary of MNIST adversarial examples that
are misclassified when reduced to different color depths.
“Adv success” measures the fraction of original images
for which we successfully found an adversarial example.
“Avg L2” measures the average L2 distortion of the suc-
cessful adversarial examples.
Figure 2: Adversarial examples for color depth reduction
(to 3 bits) on CIFAR-10. Distortions, from left to right:
0.0194, 0.0954, 0.322, 0.942, 0.948, 0.948. Layout is the
same as Figure 1.
balance between the accuracy on adversarial inputs and
accuracy on benign images for CIFAR-10. We succeeded
at generating adversarial examples for all original im-
ages, with an average distortion of 0.945. Figure 2 shows
a sample of these adversarial examples. For comparison,
adversarial examples for a classifier without color depth
reduction have an average distortion of 0.214. Although
this method of squeezing increases the distortion needed
for successfully generating non-targeted adversarial ex-
amples using the same optimization method, again, such
a distortion is still small and imperceptible.
Summary. An adaptive attacker can successfully gen-
erate adversarial examples with small distortions for a
system that applies color depth reduction to the input im-
age before classifying it.
3.1.2 Evading spatial smoothing
Xu et al. propose a second method for feature squeez-
ing, which applies a median filter to the input, which re-
places each pixel with the median value of a neighbor-
hood around the pixel.
Filter size Adv success Avg L2
3×3 100% 1.29
2×2 100% 1.57
5×5 100% 0.612
3×1 100% 1.33
1×3 100% 1.29
2×1 100% 1.52
1×2 100% 1.51
5×1 100% 0.943
1×5 100% 0.931
Table 2: Summary of MNIST adversarial examples that
are misclassified when spatially smoothed with varying
sizes of median filters. Columns have the same meaning
as in Table 1. Some filters make adversarial examples
easier to find.
Figure 3: Adversarial examples for spatial smoothing
(with 3× 3 filter) on MNIST. Distortions, from left to
right: 0.236, 0.241, 0.282, 1.27, 1,31, 1.31. Layout is the
same as Figure 1.
To generate adversarial examples that are misclassi-
fied after spatial smoothing, we use the procedure from
Section 2.4 with the addition of a median filter as part of
the classification model. A median filter for TensorFlow
was not available, so we implemented our own.
Attack results on MNIST. We evaluate a range of me-
dian filter sizes, ranging from 1×2 to 5×5. For a 3×3
filter, with which Xu et al. achieved the best accuracy, we
successfully generated adversarial examples for all orig-
inal images, with an average distortion of 1.29. Figure 3
shows a sample of these adversarial examples. Table 2
summarizes our results for other filter sizes. Larger me-
dian filters did not require greater distortion. Compared
to adversarial examples generated for a system without
any spatial smoothing (average distortion of 1.38), the
average distortion is not increased.
Attack results on CIFAR-10 We evaluate a 2×2 me-
dian filter, which Xu et al. identify as achieving a good
rejection rate of adversarial examples and accuracy on
benign images on CIFAR-10. We successfully generated
adversarial examples for all original images, which have
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Figure 4: Adversarial examples for spatial smoothing
(with 2× 2 filter) on CIFAR-10. Distortions, from left
to right: 0.0273, 0.0537, 0.0584, 0.198, 0.211, 0.212.
Layout is the same as Figure 1.
an average distortion of 0.205. Figure 4 shows a sample
of these adversarial examples. The average distortion is
not higher than for a system without spatial smoothing
(0.214).
Summary Spatial smoothing alone is not an effective
defense against an adaptive attacker. We have shown that
an adaptive adversary can create adversarial examples for
a system that applies spatial smoothing which are not
more distorted than adversarial examples for a baseline
system that does not apply spatial smoothing.
3.2 Evading combination of multiple
squeezing techniques
While the individual feature squeezing techniques are
weak against an adaptive attacker, we investigate
whether the detection scheme that combines them is
stronger. In this case, we find that this detection scheme
is not much stronger than the strongest component de-
fense, color depth reduction.
Background: Composite feature squeezing defense
The detection scheme combines both methods of squeez-
ing. In particular, the detection system has three
“branches,” where each one runs the classifier on a dif-
ferent version of the input, the original input, a reduced-
color-depth version and a spatially-smoothed version of
the original input. These three branches output different
softmax probability vectors, and the scheme compares
the L1 distance between these vectors against a threshold
to determine whether the input is adversarial.
In this experiment, we evaluate the effectiveness of
the combined defense against an adaptive attacker, i.e.,
whether adversarial examples can be misclassified and
bypass this detection scheme.
Attack Approach. We use the procedure from Sec-
tion 3.1.1 with modifications to support the detection
mechanism. In this attack, we run two instances of the
Figure 5: Adversarial examples for combined feature
squeezing detection on MNIST. Distortions, from left to
right: 2.00, 2.04, 2.39, 4.66, 4.77, 4.79. Layout is the
same as Figure 1.
model in parallel during optimization, representing the
detector branches that operate on the input and the spa-
tially smoothed version of the input. The optimizer re-
ceives gradients from both models, equally. We do not
include the reduced-color-depth branch in the gradient
calculation, because the color depth reduction removes
gradient information; it is, however, included when we
compute the L1 score. We collect only adversarial exam-
ples that have an L1 score below a threshold of 0.3076,
a level at which Xu et al. achieved the best accuracy in
their experiments on MNIST.
Attack results on MNIST We evaluate a combination
of color depth reduction to 1 bit and smoothing with a
2× 2 median filter, which Xu et al. found to be accu-
rate on adversarial examples generated by a static adver-
sary [31]. We successfully generated adversarial exam-
ples for all original images, with an average distortion of
4.76 and L1 score of 0.209. Figure 5 shows a sample of
these adversarial examples. These examples are misclas-
sified and successfully evade detection. This distortion
is 23.3% larger than for color depth reduction alone, but
still very small.
Attack results on CIFAR-10. We evaluate a combi-
nation of color depth reduction to 3 bits and smoothing
with a 2×2 median filter, a combination of settings that
perform well in Xu et al.’s experiments. We successfully
generated adversarial examples for all original images,
with an average distortion of 0.601 and L1 score of 0.168.
Figure 6 shows a sample of these adversarial examples.
These examples are misclassified and successfully evade
detection. This distortion is even lower than that of the
color depth reduction defense alone. Although Xu et al.
do not prescribe a threshold specific to CIFAR-10, the
average L1 score for these examples is lower (i.e., de-
tected as less adversarial) than the average L1 score for
the original images, which is 0.225.
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Figure 6: Adversarial examples for combined feature
squeezing detection on CIFAR-10. Distortions, from left
to right: 0.117, 0.120, 0.130, 0.604, 0.614, 0.617. Layout
is the same as Figure 1.
Figure 7: Adversarial examples for specialists+1 on
MNIST. Distortions, from left to right: 0.587, 0.659,
0.808, 2.49, 2.51, 2.51. Layout is the same as Figure 1.
Results show that distortion in generated adversarial ex-
amples are imperceptible.
Summary. The detection scheme that combines two
methods of squeezing is not always stronger than the
strongest component, color depth reduction. The im-
provement is low even on MNIST, which is particu-
larly well suited for feature squeezing, with images be-
ing black and white (little change from color depth re-
duction) and having large, contiguous areas of the same
color (little change from spatial smoothing). On CIFAR-
10, the combined attack requires less distortion than the
color depth reduction defense alone.
4 Evading ensemble of specialists
We study a second defense that combines multiple com-
ponent defenses, an ensemble of specialists, proposed by
Abbasi and Gagne´ [1].
Background: ensemble of specialist defense. The de-
fense consists of a generalist classifier (which classifies
among all classes) and a collection of specialists (which
classify among subsets of the classes). The specialists
classify subsets of the classes as follows. Where C is the
set of all K classes in the task, for each class i, let Ui be
the set of classes with which i is most often confused in
adversarial examples. To compute Ui, Abbasi and Gagne´
select the top 80% of misclassifications caused by non-
targeted FGSM attacks for each class i. Further, K addi-
tional subsets are defined: UK+i =C \Ui to be the com-
plement set of Ui. For each j = 1, ...,2K, a specialist
classifier Fj is trained on a subset of the dataset contain-
ing images belonging to the classes in U j to classify input
images into the classes in U j only. In addition, a general-
ist classifier F2K+1 is trained to classify input images into
classes in U2K+1 = C. Each classifier in the ensemble
may be susceptible to basic adversarial examples, but the
proposed defense assumes that each specialist can detect
a few specific attacks, thus the attacker cannot fool all
specialists and the generalist at the same time. The de-
fense combines them to jointly detect general adversarial
examples.
In order to classify an input, the system first checks if,
for any class i, the generalist classifier and all specialists
that can classify i agree that the input belongs to class i.
If such a class i exists, note that at most one class can
get the generalist’s vote, it must be unique. In this case,
the system outputs i as the class. Otherwise, at least one
classifier has misclassified the input, and the prediction
follows the majority vote from all classifiers in the en-
semble.
Abbasi and Gagne´ [1] find that using an ensemble
constructed this way successfully reduces the system’s
confidence (fraction of voting classifiers that voted for
the winning class) on adversarial examples generated by
a static attacker using FGSM [7], DeepFool [22], and
Szegedy et al.’s approach [28]. They conclude that a
classification system can use an ensemble of diverse spe-
cialists this way and detect low-confidence examples as
adversarial.
Attack approach. In this experiment, we evaluate the
effectiveness of Abbasi and Gagne´’s specialists+1 en-
semble against an adaptive attacker. We considered a
scenario where a user provides an image to a system, and
the system uses a specialists+1 ensemble to classify the
image or reject it as adversarial.
We attempt to create targeted adversarial examples,
where we chose target classes randomly. For each origi-
nal image, then our goal is to create an adversarial exam-
ple that is classified as the target class by the generalist
classifier and all applicable specialists at the same time,
resulting in the maximum possible confidence that the
image is not adversarial. We use the procedure from Sec-
tion 2.4 to generate adversarial examples. We modified
the loss function to support multiple classifiers:
loss(x′) = ‖x′− x‖22+ c∑ j∈{1,...,2K+1};y∗∈U j J(Fj(x
′),y∗)
We evaluate this defense on MNIST only. While Ab-
basi and Gagne´ also propose the defense for CIFAR-10,
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the architecture described in their experiments have low
accuracy, resulting in low confidence even in benign im-
ages.
Attack results on MNIST. We successfully generated
adversarial examples for all original images, which have
an average distortion of 2.50. Figure 7 shows a sample
of these adversarial examples in the second row. These
adversarial examples are classified as the target label by
the generalist and all applicable specialists, giving them
the highest confidence possible. The distortion needed is
81.2% higher than for a non-ensemble MNIST classifier.
Although this defense defines the specialists to focus
on common misclassifications caused by non-targeted
adversarial examples, it is still weaker at detecting the
common misclassifications. Among the examples, 33
targeted a class that the original image’s ground truth
class was commonly confused with. The average dis-
tortion for these images is 1.86, below the average of the
entire set.
Summary. The specialists+1 ensemble does not ef-
fectively ensure low confidence on adversarial exam-
ples generated by an adaptive attacker. An adaptive at-
tacker can successfully generate adversarial examples
with small distortions, which are unanimously classified
as a target class, and thus evade the detection of the spe-
cialist+1 ensemble defense.
5 Evading ensemble of detectors
In the previous sections, we have investigated ensembles
of defenses that are intentionally constructed to be useful
together. In Xu et al.’s work, the color depth reduction is
intended to remove small changes to many pixels, and
the median smoothing to remove large changes to a few
pixels. Similarly, Abbasi and Gagne´ propose using an
ensemble of generalist and specialist classifiers together;
without the others, this approach would not be useful.
To study the effectiveness of ensembling defenses
more broadly, we merge together a number of recently
proposed detectors that were not designed to be used in
conjunction with any other detector. We consider only
detectors that are applied to a fixed classification net-
work for simplicity, and therefore study the following
schemes:
• Gong et al. propose using adversarial training to
detect adversarial examples [6]. Given the original
model, generate adversarial examples on the train-
ing data. Then, train a new classifier that distin-
guishes the original training data from the adversar-
ial data.
Source Defense
Gong Metzen Feinman
Ta
rg
et Gong 100% 51% 21%
Metzen 43% 100% 18%
Feinman 96% 92% 100%
Table 3: Probability that adversarial examples con-
structed for a given source defense also fool the given
target defense on CIFAR-10. Defenses generated against
Metzen et al. transfer to the others with the highest prob-
ability, and Feinman et al. with lowest.
• Metzen et al. construct a similar scheme, however
instead of using the original images as the input to
the detector, they train on the inner convolutional
layers of the network [21].
• Feinman et al. examine the final hidden layer of a
neural network and find that adversarial examples
are separable from the original images by training a
density estimate using Gaussian kernels [5].
When using Carlini and Wagner’s attack, these ap-
proaches are known to provide only slight increases in
robustness, i.e., only increase the required distortion
slightly when generating the adversarial examples with
the detector vs. without the detector [4]. Given this, we
now examine if constructing an ensemble of these de-
fenses provides additional robustness. To ensemble these
defenses, we run each detection method and report the
input as adversarial if any of the three detectors do.
Attack approach. We perform this experiment on
CIFAR-10 exclusively, as Metzen et al.’s defense is in-
tended for CIFAR-10. We are able to construct adver-
sarial examples for all defenses independently. To defeat
all three defenses together, we construct a new classifier
G(·) so that using the loss function from Section 2.4 di-
rectly can construct adversarial examples.
We use the same notation as [4]. Let F(·) be a classi-
fier on N classes, and softmax(F(·))i be the probability
of class i (so that F(·)i are the logits). Let {D j(x)}Jj=1
be one of J different detectors so that the probabil-
ity that detector D j reports object x as adversarial is
sigmoid(D j(x)) (that is, D j returns the logits). We report
that an instance is an adversarial example if the probabil-
ity of any detector is greater than one half. That is, if for
any j, sigmoid(D j(x))> 12 , or, alternatively, D j(x)> 0.
When we ensemble the three defenses, we set J = 3
and define D(x) = max j D j(x), so that D(x) reports ad-
versarial (i.e., D(x)> 0) if any of the three detectors do.
Given this, we use the same G(·) construction as
Carlini and Wagner’s previous work on these de-
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fenses [4]. This function G(·) returns N+1 classes (with
the new class reserved for adversarial examples) so that
arg maxi G(x)i = arg maxi F(x)i when x is not adversar-
ial, and arg maxi G(x) = N+1 when x is adversarial. To
do this, [4] specifically defines
G(x)i =
F(x)i if i≤ N(D(x)+1) ·max
j
F(x) j if i = N+1
If for a given instance x, D j(x) > 0 (for any classifier
j) then we will have arg maxi G(x)i = N + 1 since we
multiply a value greater than one by the largest of the
other output logits. Conversely, if arg maxi G(x)i 6=N+1
then we must have D(x) < 0 implying that all detectors
report the instance is benign.
Therefore, by constructing adversarial examples on G
so that the target class is not N + 1, we can construct
adversarial examples on F that are not detected by any
detector.
Attack results on CIFAR-10 The L2 distortion re-
quired to construct adversarial examples on an unsecured
network is 0.11. To construct adversarial examples on
this network G(·) with the three defenses increases the
distortion to 0.18, an increase of 60%. However, this
distortion is still imperceptible.
Transferability of adversarial examples across differ-
ent detectors. In order to understand the reason that
these defenses do not significantly increase robustness
when combined together, we hypothesize that the trans-
ferability property [28, 7, 24, 19] of adversarial exam-
ples is simplifying the attacker’s task. To verify this, we
construct adversarial examples on each of the three de-
fenses in isolation and check the probability that these
examples also fool the other two defenses. Table 3 con-
tains this data. From this, we can see why constructing
an ensemble of these weak defenses is not significantly
more secure than each independently: the adversarial ex-
amples that fool one detector also often fool the other
detectors.
6 Conclusion
Our goal in this paper is to examine whether multiple
(possibly weak) defenses can be combined to create a
strong defense. Towards this goal, we studied three such
defenses that combined multiple defense components:
two recently proposed defenses designed with rationale
of why their components should work well together and
one that combined unrelated recently proposed detectors.
We showed that an adaptive adversary can generate ad-
versarial examples with low distortion that fool all of the
defenses and components that we evaluate. The feature
squeezing detection scheme, which combines two meth-
ods of squeezing an input image, is at best marginally
stronger than color depth reduction alone. The spe-
cialists+1 ensemble, which combines several specialist
classifiers, increases the required distortion slightly, but
again, distortion is still small. We also showed that com-
bining a collection of recently proposed detection mech-
anisms is also ineffective. In particular, our results show
that adversarial examples transfer across the individual
detectors.
Our work sheds light on a few important lessons when
evaluating defenses against adversarial examples: 1) one
should evaluate defenses using strong attacks. For exam-
ple, FGSM can quickly generate adversarial examples,
but may fail to generate successful attacks when other it-
erative optimization based methods can succeed; 2) one
should evaluate defenses using adaptive adversaries. It
is important to develop defenses that are secure against
attackers who know the defense mechanisms being used.
Finally, our results indicate that combining weak de-
fenses does not significantly improve the robustness of
these systems. Developing effective defenses against ad-
versarial examples is an important topic. We hope our
work sheds light for future work in this area.
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A Gumbel-Softmax reparameterization
Defenses that mask a network’s gradients by quantizing
the input values pose a challenge to gradient-based opti-
mization methods for generating adversarial examples,
such as the procedure we describe in Section 2.4. A
straightforward application of the approach would find
zero gradients, because small changes to the input do not
alter the output at all. In Section 3.1.1, we describe an
approach where we run the optimizer on a substitute net-
work without the color depth reduction step, which ap-
proximates the real network. We rely on the optimizer
stumbling across images that happen to be misclassified
after the color depth reduction would take place. This
worked in our experiments.
In this section, we describe an alternative approach
that allows us to use the same optimizer (Adam) to search
over the space of quantized images, by using Gumbel-
Softmax reparameterization [13, 20].
Background: Gumbel-Softmax reparameterization.
In short, the Gumbel-Softmax reparameterization trick
changes a discrete optimization problem into a problem
of optimizing distributions. In the reparameterized prob-
lem, the input image is created by sampling discrete-
valued samples from distributions (one per channel, per
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Bit depth Adv success Avg L2 L2 bound
1 100% 7.49 2.57
2 100% 6.38 0.920
3 100% 5.72 0.407
4 100% 5.36 0.197
5 100% 5.33 0.108
6 100% 5.34 0.0606
7 100% 5.63 0.0287
Table 4: Summary of MNIST adversarial exam-
ples generated by Gumbel-Softmax reparameteriazation.
Columns have the same meaning as in Table 1. “L2
bound” measures the lowest possible average L2 distance
from integer-valued images to the original images, which
is when the original images’ pixels are rounded to the
nearest quantized color.
pixel). Each distribution is represented by a set of
continuous-valued parameters. During backpropagation,
gradients arriving at the integer-valued samples affect the
parameters representing the distribution from which the
samples were drawn, pushing the distribution toward an
optimal value.
Attack approach. We set up a network to sample a
discrete-valued image, acting as a color-depth-reduced
input, connected to the input of a classifier. The net-
work samples the discrete-valued image from Gumbel-
Softmax distributions (one distribution for each channel
of each pixel). We the approach from Section 2.4, but
optimizing the distributions instead of optimizing the im-
age directly. At each step of the optimization, we check
if the sampled image is misclassified, and we retain the
one closest to the original image.
Attack results onMNIST. We evaluate color depth re-
duction to 1 – 7 bits. For reduction to 1 bit (the strongest
color depth reduction evaluated), we successfully gener-
ated adversarial examples for all original images, with
an average L2 distortion of 7.48. For comparison, sim-
ply rounding the original images to 1-bit color depth re-
sults in an average L2 distortion of 2.56. Table 4 summa-
rizes our results for other bit depths. Again, squeezing to
fewer bits increases the average distortion.
CIFAR-10 We evaluated color depth reduction to 3
bits (a good balance between accuracy on adversarial in-
puts and on benign images). We succeeded at generat-
ing adversarial examples for all original images, with an
average L2 distortion of 2.32. For comparison, simply
rounding the original images to 3-bit color results in an
average distortion of 2.27.
Summary The reparameterized optimization suc-
ceeded at generating adversarial images, but the proce-
dure did not produce adversarial images with the low-
est distance to original (unquantized) images. This is, in
part, because it always results in an image that is already
quantized, which is necessarily at least some distance
away from a high-color-depth original image. However,
this approach may be useful in attacks on other defenses
that try to obfuscate gradients through quantization. We
find that the distance to the unquantized images is not
much larger than the minimal distance between the orig-
inal image and its normally quantized version.
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